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BAR BRIEFS
INSURANCE-AUTHORITY OF AGENT TO BIND INSURER BY ORAL AGREE-
MENT, WAIVER OF FIRST PREMIUM, NON-DELIvERY OF POLICY. Agent
accepted an oral application for a policy of fire insurance covering
personality, waiving payment of the first premium, subject to a rate to
be determined, and stating said policy to be effective at once and to cover
loss by fire occurring between the time of application and before delivery
of the policy to the insured. Held, on such facts, the contract of insurance
was consumated and the insured was entitled to the proceeds of the policy.
Ulledalen v. United States Fire Insurance Co., (N. D. 1946) 23 N. W. (2d)
856.
It is well established that to effectuate a contract of insurance, the
agent must bp acting within the scope of his actual or apparent authority
and that there must be a meeting of the minds with regard to the terms
of the contract, subject matter, parties, amount of indemnity, duration of
risk, extent of risk, and rate of premium. Anderson v. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co., 45 N. D. 456, 178 N. W. 434 (1920) ; Morford v. California Western
States Life Ins. Co., 166 Ore. 575, 113 P. (2d) 629 (1941); Nordness v.
Mutual Cash Guaranty Fire Ins. Co., 22 S. D. 1, 114 N. W. 1092 (1908).
Acceptance of the application, by one having such authority to accept, is
essential to the formation of the insurance contract and until this is done
the application is not a contract, but merely a proposal. Wacker v. Globe
Fire Ins. Co., 37 N. D. 13, 163 N. W. 263 (1917). In addition to the accept-
ance by the insurer, there must be an actual or constructive delivery of the
policy; on the theory that delivery is necessary to the validity of a written
instrument. Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Whitman, 75 Ohio St. 312, 79 N. E. 459,
9 Ann. Cas. 218 (1906) ; Vance, Insurance (2nd ed. 1930) 204.
North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, Section 26-0702, provides that
''any person soliciting insurance on behalf of any insurance corporation
or on behalf of any person desiring insurance of any kind, or transmits
an application for a policy of insurance other than for himself, to or from
any insurance corporation, or makes any contract for insurance, or collects
any premiums, is regarded as agent of such corporation to all intents and
purposes, unless it can be shown that he receives no compensation for such
services."
Interpretations of such statutory provisions uniformly hold that
soliciting insurance, receiving applications, forwarding premiums, and
transmitting policies is sufficient to establish the fact of agency on behalf
of the insurance company, New York Life Ins. v. Hanson, 71 N. D. 383, 2 N.
W. (2d) 163, 170 (1941) ; Bekken v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc., 70 N. D. 122,
293 N. W. 200 (1940); Lechler v. Montana Life Ins. Co., 48 N. D. 644, 186
N. W. 271, 23 A.L.R. 1193 (1921), and that the effect of such statutes is,
"to forestall defenses based on the premise that the agent, was in fact,
agent for the insured and not for the insurer" Schoener v. Hekla Fire Ins.
Co., 50 Wis. 575. 7 N. W. 544 (1880) ; Stearns v. Merchants Life & Casualty
Co., 38 N. D. 524, 165 N. W. 568 (1917); French v. State Farmers' M. H.
Ins. Co., 29 N. D. 426, 151 N. W. 7, L.R.A. 1915D, 766 (1915); American
Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co., 74 Fla. 130, 77 So. 168 (1917).
That the business of insurance is quasi-public in nature and that such
business may be regulated generally and specifically by the state through
exercise of its police power in the interest of the general welfare is well
established. National Union F. Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71, 43 S.
Ct. 32, 67 L. Ed. 136 (1922); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 233 U. S.
389, 34 S. Ct. 612, 58 L. Ed. 1011, L.R.A. 1915C, 1189 (1913).
Thus, interpretation of the above North Dakota statute and like
statutes of other jurisdictions indicates that the restrictive titling of the
agent by the insurer as a "soliciting agent only," in an attempt to narrow
the field of the agent's activities, is immaterial, "since the authority of
the agent is such as is expressly given him by his principal, and in addition
thereto, such as his appointment and duties necessarily imply," McCabe
Brothers v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 N. D. 19, 81 N. W. 426, 47 L.R.A. 641 (1899).
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This ruling being predicated "upon whether a third party would have
reasonable grounds for believing the agent had authority given by the
principal, and this a question of actual fact and not mere title." Anderson
v. Northwestern Fire & M. Ins. Co., 51 N. D. 917, 201 N. W. 514 (1924).
True, the insurer may limit the powers of the agent, but these limitations
must be. made known to third parties dealing with the agent, and the
principal is bound by the acts of the agent when such acts are within the
apparent scope of the agent's authority. Michigan Idaho Lumber Co. v.
Northern Fire & M. Ins. Co., 35 N. D. 244, 16 N. W. 130 (1916) ; Union
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U. S. 222, 13 Wall. 222, 20 L. Ed. 617
(1872); St. Paul Fire & M. Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 47 Minn. 352, 50 N. W.
240 (1891).
In the principal case an ostensible agency relationship arose, for the
insured was under the impression that the agent was the company to all
intents and purposes; hence, the insurer was estopped to deny the agent's
apparent authority to accept the application and waive the payment of
the first premium, Wieland v. St. Louis Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
146 Minn. 255, 178 N. W. 499 (1920) ; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Walter, 51 Neb.
182, 70 N. W. 938 (1897). And the taking of an oral application, when
accepted, binds the insurer, notwithstanding that the policy has not yet
been issued or delivered. Anderson v. Northwestern Fire & M. Ins. Co.,
51 N. D. 917, 201 N. W. 514 (1920); 26 C. J. 54; 44 C. J. S. 96.
In the instant case, where the policy had been issued and forwarded
to the agent but had not been delivered by the agent to the insured, the
defendant company contended that the policy had not been delivered, there-
fore the contract of insurance was not effective. "In the absence of other
evidence to show assent of the company to the making of a contract of
insurance, delivery of the policy must be shown." Newark Machine Co. v.
Kenton Ins. Co., 50 Ohio St. 549, 35 N. E. 1060, 22 L.R.A. 768 (1893).
Thus, it may be stated as a general rule, "that delivery is necessary
to the validity of a written instrument, nevertheless, the actual delivery
or non-delivery of a policy of insurance is not always the final test of a
contract of insurance, .. .." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitman, 75 Ohio
St. 312, 79 N. E. 459, 9 Ann. Cas. 218 (1906) ; Herring v. American Ins.
Co., 123 Iowa 553, 99 N. W. 130 (1904) ; Pruitt v. Great Southern Life Ins.
Co., 202 La. 527, 12 So. (2d) 261 (1942). Accordingly, on the facts of the
principal case, the policy had been issued and the act of issuance bound
the insurer; since the issuance, unequivocally, was indicative of the assent
of the company to the making of the contract of insurance, thus the actual
delivery of the policy to the insured was immaterial.
DOUGLAS B. HEEN.
DIVORCE-ALIMONY-POWER OF COURTS TO DECLINE LIENS. A divorce
decree was awarded granting the plaintiff-wife a specific amount of money
payable monthly until further order of the court. The court further ordered
that, "she have and is awarded judgment against the defendant for said
sums and debts as aforesaid, all in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant and such judgment is made a lien upon any and all properties
of and belonging unto him and any and all earnings which he may here-
after attain or acquire." The action under discussion was then brought by
the husband to clear title to land owned by him, and to test the lien declared
on the land by the court in the divorce decree.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in the syllabus stated "While
the district court, in an action for divorce, has p>ower to decree alimony to
the wife and to require future payments thereof for an indefinite period,
subject to the power of the court to change the amounts and terms of
payment, the district court has no power to decree that the provision for
such payments is a lien upon all the property of or belonging to the
